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POLAND: Continued Resistance

Sporadic resistance to martial law continues, and the atmosphere remains volatile. Conflicting media coverage suggests that there is debate within the regime on Lech Walesa's fate. Several Western governments have announced new sanctions, none of which are dramatic.

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The US Consul in Poznan has heard unconfirmed reports of sporadic, short protests in local factories and rumors of an impending student demonstration. He believes that the excessive use of force against students there on 13 February has appalled most citizens and increased the chances of more serious demonstrations.

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Swedish radio recently broadcast a tape recording--smuggled out of Poland--of an alleged clandestine radio transmission. Neither this "broadcast" nor those mentioned in previous press reports, however, have been monitored in the West.

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Comment: Although there evidently have been fewer incidents of actual resistance over the past week than during the first half of February, anger and frustration continue to run deep. In such an atmosphere, minor local protests could get out of control, especially if the police overreact. Despite government warnings of greater repression, there is still a widespread expectation of increased opposition in the spring.

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The Polish news agency and the military daily have explicitly criticized Walesa for serving as a figurehead in an anti-Communist crusade and opposing the interests of the working class. Last Saturday, the party daily

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approvingly cited Walesa's statement to his priest that he had not authorized any leaflets calling for resistance to martial law. []

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Comment: The attack on Walesa indicates that some in the regime have given up on trying to get him to cooperate. The contrasting coverage, however, suggests continuing debate over what to do with Walesa. It also could reflect a broader internal debate over the fate of internees in general and the future of the trade union movement. []

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//Foreign Ministers of the EC countries agreed yesterday to limit imports of machinery and luxury goods from the USSR, although Greece continued to oppose sanctions. The Foreign Ministers also approved \$9 million of humanitarian aid for Poland, to be handled by private agencies.// []

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//Canada yesterday suspended new credits to Poland other than for food, and said that it supports a delay in Polish debt rescheduling negotiations. Ottawa also announced diplomatic sanctions against Poland and the USSR similar to those announced by Belgium on Monday.// []

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Comment: //The newly announced sanctions are more notable for their political content than for their economic effect. Prospects for Allied sanctions on grain exports and imports of Soviet energy and raw materials remain poor.// []

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LIBYA-GHANA: Tripoli's Increasing Support

Mounting circumstantial evidence indicates that Libya has become increasingly involved in supporting the Ghanaian Government.

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Ghana's worsening security and economic situation, coupled with the regime's fear of possible exile activities, has forced Head of State Rawlings to rely increasingly on the Libyans. Libyan leader Qadhafi apparently regards Ghana as a priority target in West Africa.

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Formation of a Ghanaian-Libyan friendship association in Accra was announced last week.

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Comment: Even with Libyan aid, Rawlings and his radical clique will have considerable difficulty dealing with the lack of discipline in the military, economic deterioration, and public dissatisfaction.

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SINGAPORE-INDONESIA-USSR: Espionage Incidents

//Singapore's expulsion of two Soviets for spying and its demand that another leave the country follow Indonesia's recent expulsion of three Soviets for espionage.//

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Singapore and Indonesia have been monitoring growing Soviet naval activity in the area. Indonesia has been particularly concerned about submarine movements through its vital and strategic straits, and an Indonesian naval officer arrested on 4 February has admitted he was passing to the Soviets documents on a US-Indonesian hydrographic survey. The Indonesians also are incensed by recent Radio Moscow support of the banned Indonesian Communist Party.

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Comment: President Suharto, facing a national election in May, will increase his political appeal by exposing Soviet espionage and interference. Jakarta and Singapore, however, probably will not take stronger diplomatic action now against the Soviets, who are already acutely embarrassed by their current blunders.

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The Indonesians are particularly sensitive to any superpower meddling in their territorial waters. They probably will increase limited surveillance of foreign traffic in the archipelago and may accelerate ASEAN intelligence exchanges and defense exercises.

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USSR - EL SALVADOR: Propaganda Campaign

The USSR is intensifying its propaganda against the Salvadoran Government by endorsing armed struggle as the left's only choice, by asserting that the junta is certain to be defeated, and by repeatedly stressing the threat of US involvement there. The last charge is also being made by a delegation of Salvadoran insurgents visiting Eastern Europe, probably under the sponsorship of the World Peace Council--a Soviet front organization. [REDACTED]

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Comment: Moscow hopes to hinder Washington's efforts to develop West European support for its policy toward Central America, while shifting international attention from Poland. The more extensive media coverage of the recent fighting may reflect growing Soviet optimism about the insurgents' prospects. [REDACTED]

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USSR-UN: Interference in CW Investigation

A special aide to the head of the UN Disarmament Center has complained to the US Mission that the Soviets are hampering the current UN investigation of charges of chemical warfare. The official claims that the Soviets have urged the Center to deny that it has received further evidence from the US about the use of chemical weapons in Asia. UN Under Secretary General Ustinov, a Soviet appointee, has asked that samples of materials collected by a UN team in Thailand be examined by a laboratory recommended by the Soviets. He wants to see reports of the remarks of all Disarmament Center officials to public groups in order to monitor the debate over the issue. [REDACTED]

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Comment: The Soviets are concerned about the diplomatic impact of the US charge that they or their clients have used chemical weapons and are trying to deflate it. They apparently are apprehensive that additional US evidence could persuade experts skeptical of the preliminary findings disclosed by the US last year. [REDACTED]

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USSR: Chernenko's Ideological Role

The party resolution--published on Sunday, marking the 60th anniversary of the USSR--endorses greater public participation as the "principal direction for the further development of the Soviet political system." This theme is further emphasized by the statement that all ruling Communist parties must "consolidate their links with the masses." This is the first major Soviet party pronouncement on ideology since the death last month of Politburo member Suslov. [redacted]

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Comment: The resolution appears to bear the imprint of Politburo member Chernenko, now the ranking party secretary after President Brezhnev, and provides the latest indication that Chernenko is assuming some of Suslov's responsibilities. Chernenko's recent articles stress that ignoring public opinion risks "danger of social tension" and political "crisis." This aspect of the resolution appears to have been framed with Poland in mind, and suggests that the Soviets believe a key factor in the breakdown of authority there was insufficient attention to public opinion. [redacted]

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USSR: Soviet Army-Navy Day

Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov and Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov harshly attacked US policies yesterday on the occasion of Soviet Army-Navy Day. Ustinov, in a *Pravda* article, stated that the threat of war from the US was "real, not imaginary." Ogarkov made a speech accusing "forces of imperialism" of harboring the "wild idea of unleashing a new world war." Ustinov stressed the theme of harmony among the different nationalities in the Soviet military. Ogarkov's speech, as carried on Soviet television, referred to Brezhnev as "secretary" instead of "general secretary."

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Comment: Ustinov's article, only excerpts of which are yet available, was largely a reiteration of themes that have become standard in recent months. He made no mention of arms control, however, a subject to which he had devoted considerable attention in a major speech last November. By stating that a limited nuclear war would spell thermonuclear disaster for "all humanity," Ustinov associated himself publicly with the most negative view of the consequences of nuclear war for the USSR. His treatment of the nationalities question was unusual and seemed defensive. Ogarkov's rendering of Brezhnev's title was so unusual as to suggest an error in reporting. Brezhnev himself sometimes signs documents merely as "secretary," but others use his full title. If Ogarkov did fail to do so, his phrasing would constitute a major slight.

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UGANDA: Fighting in Kampala

At least 69 people reportedly were killed in an outbreak of heavy fighting in Kampala yesterday. Although a government statement cites a guerrilla attack on Army facilities as the cause of the violence, a Ugandan official has informed the US Embassy that the trouble started with a mutiny among troops ordered transferred out of the capital. The Embassy has been told that two senior Army commanders are under house arrest. The government has denied a press report that there was an unsuccessful assassination attempt against Vice President Muwanga. [redacted]

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Comment: //The fighting almost certainly was prompted in part by continuing tribal tension in the Army. [redacted]

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[redacted] The reported detention of the two Acholi commanders could lead to more unrest.//

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JAPAN-POLAND-USSR: Economic Sanctions

The sanctions approved by the cabinet yesterday against Poland and the USSR align Japan with West European countries. [REDACTED]

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Comment: The government is sensitive to the complaints of Japanese businessmen who believe that West European competitors took unfair advantage of Japan's post-Afghanistan sanctions and that the sanctions at best limit economic relations with Poland and the USSR to the current level. Japanese-Soviet trade last year reached \$5.3 billion, up 14 percent, and should sustain that level in 1982 in part because of prior commitments to supply the Soviets with pipe and pipelayers for gas pipeline projects. Soviet access to Japanese technology will be largely unaffected by suspension of meetings by the joint Committee on Science and Technology Cooperation because it is only one of many channels for technical exchanges. [REDACTED]

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

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POLAND: A Party in Disarray

The long-delayed session of the party's Central Committee that begins today appears primarily intended to demonstrate that the party is still a vital force. The party has made scant progress, however, toward resolving internal differences and reasserting its leading role. The session may provide indications of the strengths of the moderate and hardline factions in the leadership, but the primacy of party chief Jaruzelski and the military will not be seriously affected. In any event, the party still faces a lengthy rebuilding process.

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The need to impose martial law and to erect the first military government in Communist history was a severe indictment of the Polish leadership and testimony to the bankruptcy of the party.

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The disintegration of the party created sharp divisions between moderates and conservatives, even though there was general agreement that martial law was necessary, that the party would have to be reestablished as the leading political force, and that a strong state apparatus would have to be created.

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Martial law vindicated the conservatives, who had consistently advocated firm measures, and they are now seeking to reshape the party in their image. When the military steps aside, they want to take over and to reject any significant reforms.

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Although the hardliners are few in number, they are disproportionately strong in the party apparatus and the security services. Consequently, they are able to exert influence through intimidation.

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The conservative side is led by former Politburo member Grabski--ousted last year after leading an attack against former party chief Kania--and Albin Siwak, an outspoken Politburo member opposed to Solidarity. Politburo member Olszowski, who wants to become party leader, may have hurt his cause by appearing to stay on the sidelines. [redacted]

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A recent document suggests that at the meeting the conservatives will renounce the policy of dialogue, demand a purge of those who supported reforms, and call for reduced ties with the West. They also want a smaller, tighter party structure that can exert unchallenged control over the party and the country. [redacted]

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The hardliners almost certainly regard Jaruzelski as a temporary leader. They need the Army, but will seek to subordinate it to their control. Although they cannot attack Jaruzelski directly, they may try to isolate him from such moderate advisers as Deputy Premier Rakowski and Politburo member Barcikowski. [redacted]

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The moderates, in contrast, are weak and on the defensive. Even before martial law they were ambivalent about the reforms demanded by Solidarity and the party rank and file. Rakowski probably represents them when he argues that the new party must not restore the autocratic, unresponsive style that was a major cause of the country's numerous crises. [redacted]

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At the local level, the moderates seem to be the main victims of purges. Their position probably would erode further with any new unrest that leads to greater repression. [redacted]

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In the meantime, the pragmatic Jaruzelski offers the moderates their best hope for continued influence because he appears committed to a course of some eventual political accommodation. His support for reform of the bureaucracy, with emphasis on technical competence, puts him on the side of the moderates on a key issue. [redacted]

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The continued party infighting solidifies Jaruzelski's position and encourages the military's appetite for power. The need to maintain control and the party's inability to rule by itself ensure that the martial law

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regime will remain in place--perhaps for a year or more--while the party is rebuilt. The hostility of many military officers toward civilians increases the chances of a thorough housecleaning. []

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The Military Council is in a strong position to perpetuate its authority to make decisions and to determine the shape of the reborn party. In addition, a general heads the Central Committee's cadre department, and reserve officers reportedly are being placed in local party positions. []

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Moscow frequently has used hardliners in the party to put pressure on Polish leaders for firmer policies. Use of this tactic has been limited, however, by the need to avoid weakening the party further by aggravating factionalism. []

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Although the Soviets are urging purges and other measures to restore party cohesiveness, they realize that the process will be long and that the time is not ripe to return to civilian rule or to place a conservative at the helm. So long as Jaruzelski appears able to maintain order and pursues policies generally in line with Soviet wishes, Moscow probably will continue to accept him as the best choice over the near term. It will not hesitate, however, to use its conservative assets to influence him to maintain a hard line. []

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If the conservatives ultimately prevail, the party will become even more isolated from society. It will be a smaller organization that will rely solely on fear and coercion to maintain control. This inherently unstable situation would provoke a new round of resistance, including attacks against party and police personnel. []

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The only hope for the party to move eventually toward an accommodation with the Polish people may be for an outsider such as Jaruzelski to retain the party leadership. Jaruzelski, however, has neither shown serious interest in remolding the party nor demonstrated the required political skills. []

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